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Good intentions may be necessary, but they are not sufficient, to prevent genocide.
Unfortunately, this renders the recent report of the Genocide Prevention Task Force,
Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers (the Albright-Cohen Report), a
recipe for failure.1 The co-chairs, former US secretaries of state and defense Madeleine
Albright and William Cohen, obviously have good intentions, and they do offer several
constructive reforms. Overall, however, the report ignores the most profound lessons of
past failures, declines to make the hard choices on policy dilemmas, and neglects to call
for the costly military reforms that could enable intervention to prevent future
genocides. A more realistic assessment of these challenges gives rise to a very different
set of recommendations than that found in the report.
The root of the problem is that the Albright-Cohen Report rests on six faulty, but
largely unstated, assumptions: first, that the only substantial obstacle to stopping
genocide is a lack of political will; second, that humanitarian intervention could be
significantly improved by increased military planning and coordination with multi-
lateral institutions; third, that the United States is often inhibited from intervening by
financial considerations and by the belief that intervention must be all or nothing;
fourth, that the political will for intervention can be fabricated by establishing new
domestic and international institutions; fifth, that existing US diplomatic strategies to
reduce genocidal violence are well conceived and thus could reduce genocidal violence
if only they were backed by more funding and political will; and, sixth, that codifying
humanitarian intervention as the automatic policy response to atrocities would reduce
the amount of genocidal violence in the world.2 These faulty assumptions give rise to
prescriptions that either are inadequate or could backfire.
Flawed Assumptions
Obviously, insufficient political will can be an obstacle to effective intervention. But it
is not the only, or even the major, hindrance in many cases. Genocidal violence often
is perpetrated too quickly for military intervention to prevent it, at least given the
current make-up and positioning of potential intervention forces. In Rwanda, for
example, most Tutsi victims of the 1994 genocide were killed in less than three weeks;
in Croatia in 1995, the army ethnically cleansed the entire Serb population of the
Krajina region in less than a week; in Kosovo in 1999, Serb forces ethnically cleansed
nearly half of the ethnic Albanian population in two weeks; and in East Timor in 1999,
Indonesian-backed militias destroyed the majority of infrastructure and displaced
most of the population in about a week. The Albright-Cohen Report calls for a new
genocide early-warning system, but that probably would not have made a difference in
these cases because US forces typically require several weeks to deploy to such hot
spots, even by air, owing to their enormous equipment needs. Moreover, the United
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States already has early-warning systems, but such systems have difficulty in
differentiating quickly between civil war and genocide.
The report’s main military proposals to improve humanitarian intervention—
increased Pentagon planning and coordination with multilateral institutions—are
insufficient and potentially counterproductive. Although the report does a good job of
delineating the potential military options to suppress genocidal violence (83), its main
Pentagon reform proposal is merely to draft a new doctrine focused on counter-
genocide operations (87). The report neglects to call for a substantial overhaul
of the equipping and basing of US forces, which would be politically divisive
but necessary for any new doctrine to improve significantly the effectiveness of
intervention. Rather than reconfiguring domestic forces, the report fancifully suggests
that the lack of ‘‘rapid reinforcement capacity . . . for UN forces could be remedied by
creating a strategic reserve that would be drawn from countries contributing to UN
missions’’ (91). Unfortunately, history demonstrates that advance international
commitments of force to UN interventions—whether peacekeepers and armored
vehicles for Rwanda or helicopters for Darfur—are not worth the paper they are
written on. Moreover, by passing the buck to the United Nations, such initiatives
undercut the prospects for quicker, more effective unilateral action.
In another vain attempt to conjure alternative intervention forces, the report
embraces a US policy, initiated in the 1990s, to train indigenous African troops for
peace operations (84–86). This initiative had a reasonable premise—that African
states would be more willing than others to risk the lives of their troops to stop conflict
on the continent—but it has faced practical obstacles. First, because of inadequate
resources and some concern about unintended consequences, the United States has
provided little, if any, weaponry or combat training. Accordingly, the participating
African forces are prepared only for the permissive environment of peacekeeping
after a conflict ends, as in Liberia in 2003.3 Second, the initiative has so far failed to
pre-position heavy weapons, armored personnel carriers, or helicopters at African
bases; as a result, in the event of a crisis, such equipment would have to be transported
and joined up with intervention forces on an ad hoc basis, wasting precious time.
Third, most training has been conducted only within national units, so that the few
trained forces remain unprepared for the multinational coalition operations that would
be necessary for any large-scale intervention. The African Union did recently establish
the framework for an African Standby Force of five regional, multinational brigades.
But this project, even after receiving some foreign assistance, is so woefully
underfunded that it remains skeletal, adding little to the few high-quality national
military units that already existed on the continent.4 In light of these shortfalls, an
all-African force has little hope of enforcing peace in a situation such as Darfur any
time soon.
The ultimate multilateral fantasy is the report’s suggested reform of UN Security
Council procedures:
The P-5 should agree that unless three permanent members were to agree to veto a
given resolution, all five would abstain or support it. This should apply, in particular, to
resolutions instituting sanctions and/or authorizing peace operations in situations
when mass atrocities or genocide are imminent or underway. (106)
In other words, China and Russia should permit the United States, the
United Kingdom, and France to decide by themselves when it is legal to violate
another state’s sovereignty. The report could have added a health advisory: don’t
hold your breath.
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No evidence is offered for the report’s assertion that the United States has been
inhibited from preventing genocide by the potential financial cost and the belief that
intervention is an all-or-nothing proposition. ‘‘The question of who would pay the bill’’
(58), claims the report, blocked US intervention in Rwanda, Darfur, and Kenya.
In reality, the United States dragged its feet in each case for political reasons: in
Rwanda because of recent casualties in Somalia; in Darfur because US troops were
overstretched in Iraq and Afghanistan and unable to contemplate another quagmire;
and in Kenya, apparently, because the White House backed the candidate who stole
the election.5 Creating a budget line for urgent intervention would not overcome such
political obstacles.
The historical record also contradicts the report’s assertion that, ‘‘in the past, the
belief that little or nothing could be done to halt or reverse an escalating crisis, short of
full-scale military intervention, has fatally undermined political will’’ (56). In reality,
the United States has employed a range of flexible responses short of full-scale
invasion by ground forces. In northern Iraq in 1991, the US military delivered
humanitarian aid and imposed a no-fly zone. In Somalia in 1992, US Marines secured
the delivery of relief aid. In Bosnia, between 1992 and 1995, the United States
gradually escalated from aid flights, to a no-fly zone, to deterrent air strikes, to
facilitating the arming and training of combatants, to bombing military installations.6
In Kosovo in 1999, the United States led NATO’s strategic bombing of Yugoslavia. In
Liberia in 2003, a small deployment of US Marines facilitated the departure of a brutal
ruler and the end of a long-running civil war.7 Even during the Rwandan Genocide in
1994, the Pentagon planned a small-scale intervention on Rwanda’s border to facilitate
the escape of refugees, but the Clinton administration chose not to implement it until
the fighting had stopped. In none of these cases was the United States deterred from
responding flexibly by a belief that only ‘‘full-scale military intervention’’ with ground
forces could do any good.
The report’s proposal to create new domestic and international institutions could
facilitate intervention, but only if there were also political will, which would not
magically be created by those institutions. The institutional recommendations include
spending $250 million per year on conflict management, creating a new early-warning
system, requiring policy reviews when warnings are received, establishing an
Atrocities Prevention Committee to guide the response, and coordinating information
sharing and intervention with international partners, including non-governmental
organizations. These are fine suggestions, but they are neither sufficient to create
the political will for intervention nor necessary when that political will already exists.
The report claims that a lack of institutional capacity explains America’s failure to
stop genocide: ‘‘We know firsthand, for example, that the attention of senior
policymakers was distracted from Rwanda in 1994 by other crises’’ (2). This excuse
for non-intervention is demonstrably untrue and smacks of attempted self-exculpation
by co-chair Albright, who at the time was ambassador to the United Nations. The
Clinton administration knew immediately when violence broke out in Rwanda, figured
out two weeks later that it was genocide, established an inter-agency task force that
met daily, and yet still refused to deploy any forces to the region until three months
later, after the genocide was over.8
Preventive or Pyromaniac Diplomacy?
The report assumes that current US strategies of preventive diplomacy are well
designed and require only more funding and more political support in order to succeed.
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But evidence has mounted for nearly two decades that aspects of these strategies can
exacerbate conflict and, therefore, should be modified or discarded. For example, the
report calls for promoting democratization and enhancing ‘‘civil society . . . [which] can
be a bulwark against the spread of violence’’ (48). But scholars have repeatedly
demonstrated that rapid democratization raises several-fold the risk of violence9 and
that building intra-group civil society actually increases intergroup violence.10
Rwanda is exemplary: the infamous hate radio was the first station outside
government hands, and the genocidal militias arose from the creation of new political
parties—both developments ironically consistent with international pressure to
expand democracy and civil society.
In keeping with recent US foreign policy, the report also advocates ‘‘threatening
legal and moral accountability for violations of international law, especially in the era
of the International Criminal Court [ICC] and ad hoc tribunals’’ (43). But there is no
evidence that such international justice mechanisms produce any deterrent effect.11 To
the contrary, there is plentiful evidence that ICC indictments in Uganda have
inhibited the resolution of a conflict that threatens millions of innocent civilians in that
country and in neighboring Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The indicted
rebel leader Joseph Kony offered to surrender if the ICC indictment were dropped in
favor of local justice mechanisms, to which Uganda’s government agreed, but the ICC
refused, thereby perpetuating the violence.12 The report, to its credit, notes that
‘‘policymakers should not dismiss the potential benefits of rewarding ‘bad people’ for
‘good behavior’ ’’ (70). But it then ignores its own advice by endorsing uncompromising
international justice mechanisms such as the ICC, concluding that ‘‘the potential
benefits do indeed outweigh the costs’’ (103). This conclusion is hardly convincing,
given that the benefits have yet to be identified while the costs already include
thousands of innocent civilians lying in unmarked graves.
Equally disturbing is that the report advocates international sanctions to compel
states to share power with opposition groups, without acknowledging or addressing the
fact that such pressure has backfired disastrously in several recent cases.13 In Rwanda
in the early 1990s, the international community withheld vital aid to successfully force
the Hutu majority regime to sign an agreement to hand power to invading Tutsi rebels.
But hard-line Hutu elements felt so threatened by the prospect of domination by the
historically oppressive Tutsi, especially after the Hutu president was assassinated,
that they instead perpetrated a final solution to kill all Tutsi.14 Similarly, in East
Timor in 1999, international sanctions successfully compelled Indonesia to hold an
independence referendum, but Indonesian-backed militias so feared the prospect of
losing power and facing retribution that they rampaged in a vain attempt to retain
control.15 The Albright-Cohen Report simplistically asserts that sanctions ‘‘may help
deter or dissuade . . . [states] from committing atrocities’’ and that ‘‘aid conditionality
may be used to improve the behavior of regimes’’ (42–43). But history demonstrates
that attempting to use sanctions to compel a regime to hand over power or territory to
its mortal enemy can backfire catastrophically—serving not as preventive but as
‘‘pyromaniac’’ diplomacy.16
The report also fails to recognize a crucial nuance—that international pressure can
have drastically different consequences depending on whether it is used to support
violent or non-violent domestic protest groups. When international sticks and carrots
are used to aid peaceful resistance movements, the target state is more likely to make
concessions toward freedom and equality. By contrast, when international pressure
seeks to coerce a state to concede to rebels, the militants typically are emboldened
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by the perceived diplomatic support, which compels the state to intensify its counter-
insurgency, thereby exacerbating humanitarian suffering and reducing the prospects
for democratization.17 Ironically, the report lists ‘‘nonviolent protest’’ as associated
with ‘‘increased risk of genocide or mass atrocities’’ (25). This may be true compared to
a situation of no protest, but it is exactly wrong in relation to the relevant comparison:
violent protest.
This underscores the signal shortcoming of the report: a failure to appreciate how
institutionalizing a humanitarian response can inadvertently backfire by creating
more humanitarian suffering, a dynamic akin to ‘‘moral hazard,’’ as I and others have
documented over the last decade.18 Since at least 1945, most genocidal violence
has been state retaliation against perceived civilian supporters of rebellion.
Humanitarian intervention aims to protect these civilians, but, in so doing, it often
rewards the rebels as well, by enabling them to attain political objectives of autonomy
or independence, as in Kosovo or Iraqi Kurdistan. The recent practice of humanitarian
intervention thus creates a perverse incentive for rebellion by militants who cannot
protect their own civilians against anticipated state retaliation—as in Bosnia, Kosovo,
and Darfur. Counterintuitive as this conclusion may seem, institutionalizing
humanitarian intervention thus causes some genocidal violence that would not
otherwise occur.
The report alludes to this moral-hazard problem once, asking, ‘‘Will overt support
to the threatened communities reduce their vulnerability or embolden them to take
actions that will only escalate the problem?’’ (57–58). But the authors do not explain
this conundrum, nor discuss what to do about it. Indeed, the report never uses
the term ‘‘moral hazard’’; it only once employs the related term ‘‘morally hazardous’’
(70) and, ironically, does so incorrectly. More troublingly, the report endorses a litany
of ‘‘targeted measures’’ (66)—including economic sanctions, arms embargoes, covert
assistance to rebels, and military intervention—all of which would exacerbate the
moral-hazard problem. More enlightened intervention measures could mitigate this
perverse dynamic, as I detail elsewhere and summarize below,19 but the report offers
no such recommendations.
A More Realistic and Effective Strategy
The Albright-Cohen Report’s stated goal of reducing genocidal violence may be
achievable by embracing a different, more realistic set of policy recommendations.
These alternative proposals are based on two key insights. First, since most genocidal
violence arises as a state response to rebellion, an enlightened intervention policy
should aim to deter both rebellion and overreaction by states, thereby reducing
the need for humanitarian military intervention to a level within the capacity of
potential interveners.20 Second, because genocidal violence can be perpetrated very
quickly if and when diplomacy fails, a main determinant of the number of lives saved is
the speed of deployment; therefore, military reforms should focus on stationing and
structuring intervention forces for rapid reaction.
Five reforms of intervention policy could help reduce moral hazard and, thus, the
amount of genocidal violence confronting potential interveners. The first reform is the
most important: the international community should refuse to intervene in any way—
diplomatic, economic, or military—to help sub-state rebels unless state retaliation is
grossly disproportionate. This would discourage militants within vulnerable sub-state
groups from launching provocative rebellions that recklessly endanger civilians
in hopes of garnering foreign intervention. At the same time, by retaining the
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intervention option for cases of disproportionate retaliation, this reform also would
discourage states from responding to rebellion by intentionally harming civilians.
All sides in civil conflicts would thus have incentives for less violent action.
Second, when interveners in a civil conflict aim to deliver purely humanitarian aid
(food, water, sanitation, shelter, and medical care), they should do so in ways that
minimize the help to rebels. Typically, rebels benefit from such deliveries by
intercepting aid convoys or by transforming refugee and internally displaced persons
(IDP) camps into training and recruitment centers. To prevent this, interveners should
provide military escort for aid convoys and deploy well-trained troops or police to
secure the perimeters of camps to prevent the entry of weapons.
Third, potential interveners should expend substantial resources to persuade
states to address the legitimate grievances of nonviolent domestic groups. In
combination with the first reform, this would undo the perverse incentive that
arises from current intervention practices, which effectively ignore nonviolent groups
because they do not provoke state retaliation but reward militants by intervening in
ways that benefit them, thereby promoting violence. Rather than punishing states
when they defend themselves against armed challenges, interveners should provide
states with incentives to address nonviolent demands in hopes of averting such
rebellion.
Fourth, interveners should not attempt to coerce states to hand over territory
or authority to domestic opposition groups unless the interveners first take steps to
reduce the danger of a deadly backlash. Failure to do so can have catastrophic
consequences, as exemplified in Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, and East Timor.21 In each of
these cases, international coercion backfired when the state resisted and retaliated
against domestic civilians, whom it perceived as allies of the enemy. At least three
measures should be employed to reduce this risk. Interveners should offer oppressive
rulers ‘‘golden parachutes,’’ including asylum and retention of wealth, if they leave
office peacefully. Likewise, interveners should guarantee a continued share of power
to existing elites, who would then have more to gain from peace than from attempting
a desperate final solution. Because these first two steps may prove inadequate,
interveners also should deploy peacekeepers prior to any coerced handover of power,
such as an independence referendum. If interveners are unwilling to take these
precautions, they should refrain from coercing regime change, to avoid magnifying the
risks of genocidal violence.
Fifth, interveners should refrain from falsely claiming humanitarian motives for
interventions that are driven primarily by other objectives, such as securing resources,
fighting terrorism, or preventing nuclear proliferation. This is because each ostensible
‘‘humanitarian’’ intervention increases the expectations of sub-state groups elsewhere
that they too will benefit from intervention if they rebel and provoke a humanitarian
emergency. A false justification for intervention in one case may thus inadvertently
promote civil war in others. In situations such as Iraq in 2003, interveners obviously
have incentive to claim falsely, or to exaggerate, their altruistic motivation. Before
doing so, however, they should weigh seriously the potential unintended consequences.
Military Reforms
Regardless of any policy reforms to reduce the incidence of genocidal violence, in some
cases civilians will still be so threatened that only military intervention can save them.
In light of the speed of violence in many recent cases, potential interveners should
concentrate on two military reforms that could get forces into the field more quickly.
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First, interveners should modify some power-projection forces so that they can deploy
faster. Currently, each planeload of US troops requires at least ten planeloads of
equipment before the troops can operate effectively, which slows deployment to a crawl
because of limited airfield capacity. Lighter forces, with fewer heavy weapons and less
armor, would require fewer cargo flights, enabling them to arrive sooner and save
more lives. Of course, shedding protective armor and weaponry could also increase
casualties, as US forces learned in Iraq after they transitioned from major combat
operations to peacekeeping in 2003.22 Such a trade-off cannot be made lightly.
The second military reform is to pre-position forces—or, at least, their heavy
equipment—at forward bases closer to where they are most likely to be needed for
humanitarian intervention, such as in Africa. Interventions could be launched from
these bases using small cargo aircraft, which are both more plentiful than wide-body
intercontinental airlifters and better able to land at rudimentary African airfields. The
tactical cargo aircraft could make several round-trips per day to a conflict zone from
forward bases, rather than one trip every few days from distant US or European bases,
and thus sharply reduce deployment time—from weeks to days. One potential hurdle
is that many African states oppose foreign military bases as tantamount to
neocolonialism, as demonstrated by the Pentagon’s recent difficulty in establishing
a proposed continental headquarters for its new Africa Command (AFRICOM).23
But such resistance could be overcome by offering sufficient incentives. The real
obstacle is that the world’s major powers, including the United States, have proved
unwilling to make significant military investments except to promote traditional
national interests.
The Challenge Ahead
The Albright-Cohen Report’s recommendations cannot achieve their stated goal and
therefore need to be supplemented. The proposals I have made here are more realistic,
requiring less frequent military intervention, yet could do more to reduce genocidal
violence. Admittedly, this alternative reform package would also face significant
political hurdles. The good news is that the United States has by far the world’s
greatest potential for humanitarian intervention—military, economic, and diplo-
matic—to prevent genocide. If the Obama administration is willing to learn from
history and modify US intervention policy and forces accordingly, the United States
can begin to fulfill the laudable ambitions of the Genocide Prevention Task Force.
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